The Role of Perspective in Mental Time Travel by Ansuini, C et al.
Research Article
The Role of Perspective in Mental Time Travel
Caterina Ansuini,1 Andrea Cavallo,2 Lorenzo Pia,3 and Cristina Becchio1,2
1Department of Robotics, Brain and Cognitive Sciences, Istituto Italiano di Tecnologia, 16163 Genoa, Italy
2Department of Psychology, University of Torino, 10123 Turin, Italy
3SpAtial, Motor & Bodily Awareness (SAMBA) Research Group, Department of Psychology, University of Torino, 10123 Turin, Italy
Correspondence should be addressed to Cristina Becchio; cristina.becchio@unito.it
Received 28 August 2015; Revised 22 October 2015; Accepted 2 November 2015
Academic Editor: Domenica Bueti
Copyright © 2016 Caterina Ansuini et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution
License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly
cited.
Recent years have seen accumulating evidence for the proposition that people process time by mapping it onto a linear spatial
representation and automatically “project” themselves on an imagined mental time line. Here, we ask whether people can adopt
the temporal perspective of another person when travelling through time. To elucidate similarities and differences between
time travelling from one’s own perspective or from the perspective of another person, we asked participants to mentally project
themselves or someone else (i.e., a coexperimenter) to different time points. Three basic properties of mental time travel were
manipulated: temporal location (i.e., where in time the travel originates: past, present, and future), motion direction (either
backwards or forwards), and temporal duration (i.e., the distance to travel: one, three, or five years). We found that time travels
originating in the present lasted longer in the self- than in the other-perspective. Moreover, for self-perspective, but not for other-
perspective, time was differently scaled depending on where in time the travel originated. In contrast, when considering the
direction and the duration of time travelling, no dissimilarities between the self- and the other-perspective emerged. These results
suggest that self- and other-projection, despite some differences, share important similarities in structure.
1. Introduction
When imagining time and their own life events, humans do
not only retrieve or predict when events have occurred or
will occur, but also automatically “project” themselves on an
imaginedmental time line [1]. Self-time travelling can thus be
regarded as the ability to transpose one’s habitual self-location
in time to different temporal “locations” in the past or the
future [2]. Emphasizing the role of perspective taking, this
ability to change one’s own temporal egocentric perspective
has been proposed to share a common mechanism with the
ability to change one’s own spatial egocentric perspective [3].
In both domains, people would use existing representations
as templates for processing and understanding new informa-
tion, in order to plan their short- and long-term behaviors.
On this account, the same processes that subserve simulation
of the self at a different location in space would also subserve
simulation of the self at a different point in time [4].
An interesting question, inspired by this parallel, is
whether, similarly to taking another person’s spatial per-
spective, people can also adopt the temporal perspective of
another person when travelling through time. Studies inves-
tigating spatial perspective taking indicate that people can
overcome their own position in space to adopt another per-
son’s spatial perspective (e.g., [5]). When the scene includes
another person, for instance, people may spontaneously
describe spatial relations from that person’s perspective
despite the very real presence of their own [5, 6]. These
and other findings suggest that spatial perspective taking
may induce an alterocentric remapping, that is, remapping
of objects and locations to an alterocentric frame of reference
[7].
To our best knowledge, no study has so far investigated
whether a similar remapping may take place in the temporal
domain. In other words, whether similarly to taking another
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person’s spatial perspective, people can take another per-
son’s temporal perspective when travelling through time. To
address this issue, in the present study we directly compared
self- and other-perspective time travelling with the goal of
testing whether/how the representation of time varies as a
function of perspective taking.
The psychological ability to traverse temporal distances
is dependent upon a cognitive representation of time that
has been suggested to be spatial in nature (e.g., [2, 8–12]; for
an overview see [13]). In this conceptualization, time travel is
characterized by three basic components: (a) temporal loca-
tion, that is, the point in (space-) time from where the travel
originates [8, 14, 15]; (b)motion direction, that is, the direction
along which projection takes place (either backwards or
forwardswith respect to the temporal location) [8, 14]; and (c)
temporal duration, that is, the temporal interval to be travelled
(for a description of similar concepts, see also [16]). Within
this framework, it has been demonstrated that rather than
being mapped to space in a uniform manner, spatiotemporal
representation presents areas of different granularity. For
instance, Christian and colleagues [17] found that when asked
to temporally locate events on a time line, participants used
more space (-time) to represent one year in the present
than in the past or the future. In a similar vein, Arzy and
colleagues [14] showed that, irrespective of the temporal
location, participants were faster and more accurate when
asked to retrieve an event or a face located forwards rather
than backwards (relative future effects in [14]; see also [8]). In
addition, the speed of self-projection in time has been shown
to depend logarithmically on the temporal distance between
the imagined self-location in time and the location of the
imagined event/face to retrieve [1].
These patterns relate to the self-referenced topography of
space-time mapping. To investigate whether similar patterns
also apply to other-projection in time, here, we asked partic-
ipants to imagine themselves or someone else at a specific
point in time (i.e., past, present, or future) and “to operate”
a notional time machine for travelling either backwards or
forwards as to reach a target destination (i.e., one, three,
or five years back/ahead). We used the travel duration as a
proxy for how space-time representation depended on the
perspective taking (self- versus other-perspective). Based on
previous evidence that the amount of space used to represent
time varies as a function of self-relevance [17], we expected
that travelling in the self-perspective would take longer than
travelling in the other-perspective. Moreover, we hypothe-
sized that this effect of perspective would be greater when
the travel originated in the present than in the past or future.
In spite of these differences, however, we also expected sim-
ilarities between self- and other-perspective time travelling.
In particular, we predicted that, for both self- and other-
perspective, travel duration would increase as a function of
the temporal distance to be travelled. Finally, we expected
that, in both perspectives and regardless of temporal location,
travelling would be facilitated for the forwards motion direc-
tion (see relative future effect [14]).
2. Methods
2.1. Participants. Twenty-five participants (15 females, aged
between 20 and 26 years, mean ± SD 23 ± 1.7 years) from the
University of Turin took part in the study. All participants
were right-handed and had normal or corrected to normal
vision and no history of neurological or psychiatric disor-
ders. All participants gave written informed consent before
inclusion in the study, which was conducted in accordance
with the principles of the revised Helsinki Declaration [18]
and approved by the Ethical Committee of the University of
Turin.
2.2. Design and Procedure. Participants were seated at a
desk approximately 50 cm away from a 17󸀠󸀠 computer screen
(refresh rate = 60Hz). At the beginning of the experiment,
they were told that their task was to operate a notional
“time machine” to travel through time. Next, they were
given instructions about the temporal perspective (self versus
other) and the time “locations” at which to imagine them-
selves. On other-perspective trials, a female coexperimenter
was seated at a desk placed perpendicularly with respect
to participant’s desk (at a distance of ∼1.5m), in front of a
computer monitor connected to participant’s monitor. While
sitting at their desk, participants could not see what was
displayed onto the monitor in front of the coexperimenter.
To control for possible effects related to age difference,
participants were recruited as to be similar in age to the
coexperimenter. At the beginning of the experiment, they
were informed about coexperimenter’s age (i.e., 24 years old).
Each trial began with the instruction to imagine one-
self (for self-perspective trials) or the other person (for
other-perspective trials) at specific past (i.e., the day of
your/coexperimenter’s 10th birthday), present (i.e., today), or
future location in time (i.e., the day of your/coexperimenter’s
50th birthday). As participants were in their late adolescence/
early adulthood, past and future locations corresponded to
two stages of development markedly distinct from their own
(i.e., a point in middle childhood and a point in middle
adulthood, resp.). From these locations, participants were
instructed to move one, three, or five years, either back-
wards or forwards. To support the experience of “travelling”
through time, an animated star-field display was projected
onto the screen in front of the participant [17, 19, 20]. The
display consisted of approximately 1000 randomly positioned
white dots on a black background (see Figure 1). The dots
(i.e., stars) were animated (25 fps) so as to appear to move,
on a linear trajectory, either toward (i.e., centripetally) or
away from (i.e., centrifugally) the center of the display, corre-
sponding to the experience of backwards and forwards self-
motion (Figure 1). Journeys in the past were accompanied by
backwards optic flow,while those in futurewere accompanied
by forwards flow (for a similar paradigm see [17]). On other-
perspective trials, the same star-field display was projected
onto the screen in front of participant and onto the screen
in front of the coexperimenter. In both self- and other-
perspective trials, the participant was instructed to look at
the screen in front of him/her for the entire duration of
the experiment. At a self-paced interval, participants were
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Figure 1: Illustrations of the direction of centripetal (a) and centrifugal (b) optic flow stimuli in trials with backwards and forwards motion
direction, respectively.
requested to press a button (i.e., space bar) to begin the time
travel (i.e., initiate the optic flow) and press it again once they
felt they had reached the target (i.e., stop the optic flow). The
“time travel” duration was calculated as the interval between
these two events. Finally, to ensure participants’ compliance
with the task requests, in 20% of the experimental trials (a
total of 72 trials per each participant, with 18 trials per each
block), we asked participants to estimate the actual duration
of their last “time travel” (in ms).
Self- and other-perspective trials were administered in
different blocks. The order of presentation was either ABBA
or BAAB. Each of the four blocks comprised 90 trials for
a total of 360 trials. For each perspective condition (self,
other), ten trials for each temporal location (past, present,
and future) by motion direction (backwards, forwards) by
temporal duration (one, three, and five years) combination
were administered. Within each block, temporal location
presentation was fully randomized and administered in
miniblock of 6 trials (i.e., one trial for each temporal duration
by motion direction combination). To familiarize partici-
pants with the procedure, at the beginning of the experiment
a practice session was administered (6 self-perspective and 6
other-perspective-trials, one trial for each motion direction
by temporal duration combination).
E-Prime V2.0 software (Psychology Software Tools Inc.,
Pittsburgh, PA, USA) running on a PC was used to present
trials and record the duration of the “time travel” (i.e.,
the time elapsed between starting and stopping the “time
machine”). The experiment lasted about 60 minutes.
2.3. Statistical Analyses. To cope with the high variability
within the range of travel duration (394–21304ms), we
converted individual temporal intervals data into 𝑧-scores,
based on means and standard deviations computed over all
trials per each participant. Since each standardized coefficient
scales appropriately to adjust for the disparity in the variable
sizes, this procedure makes it possible to bring all of the
variables into proportion with one another without losing
the possibility to directly compare participants’ performance
across conditions. The mean 𝑧-scores were then averaged
separately for each trial type (i.e., temporal location by each
motion direction by temporal duration in both perspectives).
The investigation of standardized data distribution using
one-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov goodness-of-fit tests did not
show any significant difference, suggesting that data distribu-
tion within the sample was Gaussian (0.196 < 𝑝
𝑠
> 0.998).
Travel duration 𝑧-scores were then submitted to a repeated
measures ANOVA with temporal location (past, present, and
future), motion direction (backwards, forwards), temporal
duration (1, 3, and 5 years), and perspective (self, other) as
within subjects factors. Main effects were used to explore
the means of interest (post hoc 𝑡-test), and Bonferroni’s
corrections (𝛼 level of 𝑝 < 0.05) were applied.
In addition, to obtain an indirect measure of participants’
compliance with the task requests over the experimental
session, we analyzed the data from the control task to test
whether participants’ ability to reproduce time intervals
decreased/increased over the four blocks. To this aim, we
first computed a temporal accuracy estimation index, defined
as the difference between the actual duration of the travel
and the corresponding temporal estimation given by the
participant at the control task trial (i.e., 20% of the total
amount of trials: 18 trials per each block for a total of 72
trials by each participant). Then, we submitted this index to
a repeated measures ANOVA with block (i.e., first, second,
third, and fourth) as within subjects factor.
3. Results
Mental Travel Task. Participants’ travel duration varied as a
function of temporal location so that travels originating in
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the present moment were longer than travels originating in
the past or in the future (main effect of temporal location:
𝐹
(2,48)
= 3.621; 𝑝 = 0.034; partial eta square = 0.131; mean
𝑧-scores= 0.078, 0.004, and−0.082, resp.;𝑝
𝑠
< 0.05).Moreo-
ver, temporal duration of journeys was longer for travelling
forwards than backwards (main effect of motion direction:
𝐹
(1,24)
= 7.305; 𝑝 = 0.012; partial eta square = 0.233; mean
𝑧-scores = 0.038 versus −0.038, resp.; 𝑝
𝑠
< 0.05). Regardless
of the temporal origin of the journey and its direction, the
travel duration increased as a function of the number of
years to travel (main effect of temporal duration: 𝐹
(2,48)
=
277.747; 𝑝 < 0.001; partial eta square = 0.920; mean 𝑧 scores
= −0.86 for 1 year; −0.01 for 3 years; 0.86 for 5 years; see
Figure 2, 𝑝
𝑠
< 0.05). As predicted, neither motion direction
nor temporal duration main effect were further qualified by
significant interactions by perspective. In contrast, the effect of
temporal location varied between self- and other-perspective
(perspective by temporal location interaction: 𝐹
(2,48)
= 6.014;
𝑝 = 0.005; partial eta square = 0.200). For self-perspective
trials, indeed, travel duration was longer when the travel
started either in the past or in the present rather than in
the future (0.034 and 0.163 versus −0.101, resp.; see Figure 2;
𝑝
𝑠
< 0.05). For other-perspective trials, in contrast, no similar
modulation of travel duration by temporal location was
reported (−0.007, −0.025, and −0.062 for present, past, and
future location; Figure 2; 𝑝
𝑠
> 0.05). Moreover, travel dura-
tionwas on average longer for the self-perspective than for the
other-perspective when the travel started in the present, but
not when it started in the past or in the future (self/present
versus other/present = 0.163 versus −0.007, resp.; 𝑝 < 0.05;
self/past versus other/past = 0.034 versus −0.025 and self/
future versus other/future = −0.101 versus −0.062, resp.; 𝑝
𝑠
>
0.05). Finally, the exploration of the significant temporal
location by temporal duration interaction (𝐹
(4,96)
= 3.780;
𝑝 = 0.007; partial eta square = 0.136) revealed that there was
no difference across temporal locations when travels lasted
either 1 year or 3 years (1 year: past = −0.897; present =
−0.793; future = −0.912 and 3 years: past = −0.016; present
= 0.057; future = −0.075; 𝑝
𝑠
> 0.05). In contrast, when
participants were requested to cover a 5-year distance, the trip
took longer when it started in the past or present rather than
in the future (5 years: past = 0.926 and present = 0.968 versus
future = 0.74; 𝑝
𝑠
< 0.5). Neither the main effect of perspective
(𝐹
(1,24)
= 1.588; 𝑝 > 0.05; partial eta square = 0.062) nor the
remaining two-, three-, or four-way interactions were found
to be significant (all𝐹
𝑠
< 1.484; 0.213 < 𝑝
𝑠
> 0.942; all partial
eta squares < 0.058).
Control Task. ANOVA revealed no significant effect of block
(𝐹
3,72
= 2.212; 𝑝 > 0.05; partial eta square = 0.084) on tem-
poral accuracy estimation index, suggesting that participants’
compliance to the task request remained stable throughout
the experiment.
4. Discussion
In this study, we assessed whether and how self- and other-
projections in time map onto similar or different spatiotem-
poral representations. For the properties of this underlying
representation to emerge, we used as a proxy the time taken
to move through time (i.e., travel duration) and manipulated
three basic properties of time journeys: temporal location
(past, present, or future), motion direction (backwards or
forwards), and temporal duration (one, three, or five years).
Our results suggest that self- and other-projections hinge
on different temporal representations depending on the
temporal location, that is, on where in time the mental travel
originates. Specifically, for self-perspective, participants took
longer to cover identical distances when the travel started in
the past or in present compared as to when it started in the
future. For other-perspective, in contrast, travel duration was
not modulated by temporal location. This effect may reflect
the tendency to form higher-level construals of information
about remote future event [21]. In this respect, Trope and
Liberman [21] suggest that “the greater the temporal distance
from a future event, the more likely is the event to be
represented abstractly in terms of a few general features that
convey the perceived essence of events rather than in terms
of more concrete and incidental details of the event.” In the
same vein, D’Argembeau and Van der Linden [22] provided
evidence that projecting oneself in a specific positive or
negative experience results in a richer representation when
the event is expected to be experienced in the near future
rather than in a more distant future. On this account,
participants would travel more rapidly from a remote future
location because they would simulate future events in more
abstract and general terms. This is further supported by
the consideration that, in contrast with remembering of
past events whose features are already integrated, simulating
remote future events requires the combination of disparate
details gleaned from a variety of episodic sources [23].
Forming abstract representations of remote future event may
thus serve a specific adaptive role in reducing the costs
required to integrate unrelated details into a coherent future
representation.
Over and above this, self- and other-projection also scaled
differently for mental travels taking place in the proximity
of the present moment. For the present location, regardless
of motion direction, one year was indeed longer in the self-
time rather than in the other-time. This was not the case for
one-year travels originating from a past or future location.
This pattern is in agreement with the finding that participants
represent self-time as occupying a greater amount of space
than an equivalent period related to others [17]. Of direct
relevance to the present study, Christian and colleagues [17]
asked three different groups of participants to “time-travel”
from the present moment to their own birthdays or to the
birthdays of either a close friend or a hypothetical stranger
of a similar age as theirs. It was found that, irrespective of
motion direction (either in the past or in the future), time
relevant to self was represented as occupyingmore space than
time relevant to others (i.e., best friend or unfamiliar other).
On a closer examination, however, this effect of self-relevance
was only evident for temporally close events (i.e., 10 years
before or after the present moment), but not more distant
events (i.e., the day of 8th or 58th birthday). Taken together
with our results, this suggests that a distinctive relationship
bounds the “self” to the “now.” As observed by Nu´n˜ez and
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Figure 2: Durations (ms) for time travelling one, three, or five years backwards (blue tone bars) or forwards (green tone bars) from the past
(10th birthday), the present (i.e., today), or the future (i.e., 50th birthday) in self-perspective (a) and other-perspective (b). Error bars depict
standard error of mean.
Cooperrider [16], indeed, within an “internal” perspective,
the ego is always and inherently colocated within the “now.”
It is perhaps therefore not surprising that self-projection is
more “embedded” in the representation of the present time
compared to other-projection. On a related note, this could
explain why recent autobiographical memories tend to be
recalled from the first-person perspective, whilemore remote
memories, particularly early childhood memories, are more
likely to be recalled from a third-person perspective [24–27].
Despite these differences, however, self- and other-projec-
tions also shared many similarities in structure. First, for
both self- and other-perspectives, travel durations increased
as a function of temporal duration (one year < three years <
five years). With only one exception (i.e., five years from
past and present lasts longer than five years from future),
this effect was not modulated by the temporal location (i.e.,
past, present, and future). This is consistent with the idea
that computation of temporal quantities rests on a common
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system for magnitude processing [28], which is (at least in
part) independent of self-relevant content specificity and
episodic memory processes. The finding that 5-year travel
duration lasted less when it originated in remote futuremight
be taken to suggest that, as far as remote future is concerned,
the spatial representation of time is compressed towards
the anchoring point. Experiments using multiple temporal
locations in remote past and future might help to address this
issue.
Second, in both self- and other-perspectives, independent
of temporal location, travelling forwards took longer than
travelling backwards. The neural system subserving mental
time travel has been proposed to have evolved to anticipate
and pilot our behavior rather than primarily encoding the
past [8, 29, 30]. In line with this, processing of events has been
shown to be future oriented across present, past, and future
self-location [8, 14]. For example, when asked to judge
whether an event takes place before (relative past) or after
(relative future) an imagined self-location in time, partici-
pants are typically faster andmore accurate for relative future
than for relative past events [8].
At first sight, the finding that travelling forwards took
longer than travelling backwards may seem contradictory to
response facilitation for future events. However, both phe-
nomenamay be parsimoniously interpreted as resulting from
an anisometric pattern of internal spatial representation of
relative past and future events, such that the representational
medium is compressed towards the relative past and dilated
towards the relative future. Compression towards the relative
past would explain why travelling backwards lasts less, but
also why judgements are more difficult (i.e., slower and less
accurate) to the relative past. Along the same lines, dilation
towards the relative future may account for both the increase
in travel duration for travelling forwards and the relative
future response facilitation.
An alternative, not mutually exclusive, explanation of
the motion direction effect refers to discrepancy between
external time direction (i.e., roughly, the time of the calendar)
and subjective time direction (i.e., the personal time which
is measured by the traveler’s wristwatch; [31]) potentially
experienced when travelling backwards. When participants
are requested to time-travel towards relative future, the
external time and their subjective time move towards the
same direction (see also [32], for similar concepts). The
subjective time may therefore be expected to add to the
external time, extending the travel duration. In contrast,
when participants travel towards relative past, the external
time goes backwards, while their subjective time moves
forwards [32]. The time traveler may therefore experience a
shrinking of travel duration. On this account, the effect of
motion direction would reflect the relative (forward) motion
of the traveler making journeys end later in the future and
earlier in the past. At this stage, both these hypotheses remain
speculative and require further study for elaboration and
validation.
5. Conclusions
A growing body of evidence indicates that self-projection in
space and in time might rest on a common neural network
and share similar cognitive processes and representations [3].
In the visuospatial domain, it has been documented that
people can transpose their own actual point of view and
“navigate” space from the perspective of someone else [5].
The current findings suggest that a similar ability might also
exist in temporal domain, supporting the notion of temporal
perspective taking.
By contrasting time travelling from self- and other-per-
spective, we found evidence that temporal representation
underlying one’s own projection shares many of the same
characteristics of the temporal representation underlying
another person’s projection. Despite the fact that a greater
“sensitivity” to temporal location for representing time in
self- rather than in other-perspective emerges, when consid-
ering more abstract properties as direction and magnitude,
self- and other-time exhibit a similar structure. Further
research is warranted to clarify whether and to what extent
these effects are sensitive to the degree of similarity between
the self and the other person. For example, it will be impor-
tant for future research to determine how travelling in time
from the perspective of a younger or older person impacts on
travel duration (depending, e.g., on whether the past/future
of the participant overlaps with the present of the other
person).
A second issue to be addressed in future studies relates to
the neural underpinnings of self- and other-projection. Self-
projection in time has shown to recruit a network of brain
areas in distinct time periods including the occipitotemporal,
temporoparietal, and anteromedial temporal cortices [4, 8].
For example, it has been reported that during mental time
travel the left lateral parietal cortex is differentially activated
by nonpresent subjective times compared with present (past
and future> present) [33]. Capitalizing on the finding that left
parietal cortex supports first-person perspective simulation
[34], these results have been interpreted to suggest that
the parietal cortex is specifically related to transformations
in subjective time. Moreover it has been demonstrated
that temporal self-projection into the personal past recruits
greater ventralmedial prefrontal cortex (mPCF)whereas self-
projection into another person’s perspective recruits greater
dorsal mPCF [35]. Asking participants to simulate mentally
past, present, and future time from their own versus another
person’s perspective might help to clarify how transforma-
tions in subjective and nonsubjective time are represented
in left parietal cortex and to elucidate the exact contribution
of the ventral and dorsal subregions of mPCF to self-
versus other-projection. Finally, the hypothesis of a partial
overlap between self- and other-mechanisms for projection
in time could be tested in neuropsychiatric patients with
temporal orientation failures [36]. To the extent that self-
and other-projection rely on a common neural mechanism,
self-referenced and other-referenced disorientation may be
expected to share common fundamental characteristics.
Neural Plasticity 7
Conflict of Interests
The authors declare there is no conflict of interests regarding
the publication of this paper.
Acknowledgments
The authors thank Delia Sanmartino and Manuela Vignolo
for their help with data acquisition. They also wish to thank
Laura Taverna for her help in preparing optic flow stimuli.
References
[1] S. Arzy, E. Adi-Japha, and O. Blanke, “The mental time line:
an analogue of the mental number line in the mapping of life
events,” Consciousness and Cognition, vol. 18, no. 3, pp. 781–785,
2009.
[2] R. L. Buckner and D. C. Carroll, “Self-projection and the brain,”
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 49–57, 2007.
[3] I. Molnar-Szakacs and S. Arzy, “Searching for an integrated self-
representation,”Communicative& Integrative Biology, vol. 2, no.
4, pp. 365–367, 2009.
[4] M. Peer, R. Salomon, I. Goldberg, O. Blanke, and S. Arzy, “Brain
system for mental orientation in space, time, and person,”
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United
States of America, vol. 112, no. 35, pp. 11072–11077, 2015.
[5] B. Tversky and B. M. Hard, “Embodied and disembodied
cognition: spatial perspective-taking,” Cognition, vol. 110, no. 1,
pp. 124–129, 2009.
[6] T. Furlanetto, A. Cavallo, V.Manera, B. Tversky, and C. Becchio,
“Through your eyes: incongruence of gaze and action increases
spontaneous perspective taking,” Frontiers in Human Neuro-
science, vol. 7, article 455, 2013.
[7] C. Becchio, M. D. Giudice, O. D. Monte, L. Latini-Corazzini,
and L. Pia, “In your place: neuropsychological evidence for
altercentric remapping in embodied perspective taking,” Social
Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 165–170,
2013.
[8] S. Arzy, I. Molnar-Szakacs, and O. Blanke, “Self in time: imag-
ined self-location influences neural activity related to mental
time travel,” The Journal of Neuroscience, vol. 28, no. 25, pp.
6502–6507, 2008.
[9] D. Casasanto and L. Boroditsky, “Time in themind: using space
to think about time,” Cognition, vol. 106, no. 2, pp. 579–593,
2008.
[10] M. Ishihara, P. E. Keller, Y. Rossetti, and W. Prinz, “Horizontal
spatial representations of time: evidence for the STEARCeffect,”
Cortex, vol. 44, no. 4, pp. 454–461, 2008.
[11] A. Torralbo, J. Santiago, and J. Lupia´n˜ez, “Flexible conceptual
projection of time onto spatial frames of reference,” Cognitive
Science, vol. 30, no. 4, pp. 745–757, 2006.
[12] A. Vallesi, M. A. Binns, and T. Shallice, “An effect of spatial-
temporal association of response codes: understanding the
cognitive representations of time,” Cognition, vol. 107, no. 2, pp.
501–527, 2008.
[13] M. Bonato, M. Zorzi, and C. Umilta`, “When time is space: evi-
dence for a mental time line,” Neuroscience & Biobehavioral
Reviews, vol. 36, no. 10, pp. 2257–2273, 2012.
[14] S. Arzy, S. Collette, S. Ionta, E. Fornari, and O. Blanke, “Subjec-
tive mental time: the functional architecture of projecting the
self to past and future,” European Journal of Neuroscience, vol.
30, no. 10, pp. 2009–2017, 2009.
[15] R. N. Spreng, R. A.Mar, and A. S. N. Kim, “The common neural
basis of autobiographical memory, prospection, navigation,
theory of mind, and the default mode: a quantitative meta-
analysis,” Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, vol. 21, no. 3, pp.
489–510, 2009.
[16] R. Nu´n˜ez and K. Cooperrider, “The tangle of space and time in
human cognition,”Trends in Cognitive Sciences, vol. 17, no. 5, pp.
220–229, 2013.
[17] B. M. Christian, L. K. Miles, and C. N. Macrae, “Your space or
mine? mapping self in time,” PLoS ONE, vol. 7, no. 11, Article ID
e49228, 2012.
[18] World Medical Association General Assembly, “Declaration
of Helsinki. Ethical principles for medical research involving
human subjects,” World Medical Journal, vol. 54, pp. 122–125,
2008.
[19] L. K. Miles, K. Karpinska, J. Lumsden, C. N. Macrae, and S.
Gilbert, “The meandering mind: vection and mental time
travel,” PLoS ONE, vol. 5, no. 5, Article ID e10825, 2010.
[20] L. C. Trutoiu, B. J. Mohler, J. Schulte-Pelkum, and H. H.
Bu¨lthoff, “Circular, linear, and curvilinear vection in a large-
screen virtual environment with floor projection,”Computers &
Graphics, vol. 33, no. 1, pp. 47–58, 2009.
[21] Y. Trope and N. Liberman, “Temporal construal,” Psychological
Review, vol. 110, no. 3, pp. 403–421, 2003.
[22] A. D’Argembeau and M. Van der Linden, “Phenomenal char-
acteristics associated with projecting oneself back into the past
and forward into the future: influence of valence and temporal
distance,” Consciousness and Cognition, vol. 13, no. 4, pp. 844–
858, 2004.
[23] D. R. Addis and D. L. Schacter, “Constructive episodic simu-
lation: temporal distance and detail of past and future events
modulate hippocampal engagement,” Hippocampus, vol. 18, no.
2, pp. 227–237, 2008.
[24] D. Berntsen and D. C. Rubin, “The centrality of event scale:
a measure of integrating a trauma into one’s identity and its
relation to post-traumatic stress disorder symptoms,”Behaviour
Research andTherapy, vol. 44, no. 2, pp. 219–231, 2006.
[25] J. F. Kihlstrom and J. M. Harackiewicz, “The earliest recollec-
tion: a new survey,” Journal of Personality, vol. 50, no. 2, pp. 134–
148, 1982.
[26] G. Nigro and U. Neisser, “Point of view in personal memories,”
Cognitive Psychology, vol. 15, no. 4, pp. 467–482, 1983.
[27] J.M. Talarico, K. S. Labar, andD. C. Rubin, “Emotional intensity
predicts autobiographical memory experience,” Memory &
Cognition, vol. 32, no. 7, pp. 1118–1132, 2004.
[28] V. Walsh, “A theory of magnitude: common cortical metrics of
time, space and quantity,”Trends in Cognitive Sciences, vol. 7, no.
11, pp. 483–488, 2003.
[29] P. Boyer, “Evolutionary economics of mental time travel?”
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, vol. 12, no. 6, pp. 219–224, 2008.
[30] M. G. Haselton and D. Nettle, “The paranoid optimist: an
integrative evolutionary model of cognitive biases,” Personality
and Social Psychology Review, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 47–66, 2006.
[31] D. Lewis, “Theparadoxes of time travel,”American Philosophical
Quarterly, vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 145–152, 1976.
[32] A. Bender and S. Beller, “Mapping spatial frames of reference
onto time: a review of theoretical accounts and empirical find-
ings,” Cognition, vol. 132, no. 3, pp. 342–382, 2014.
8 Neural Plasticity
[33] L. Nyberg, A. S. N. Kim, R. Habib, B. Levine, and E. Tulving,
“Consciousness of subjective time in the brain,” Proceedings of
the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America,
vol. 107, no. 51, pp. 22356–22359, 2010.
[34] P. Ruby and J. Decety, “Effect of subjective perspective taking
during simulation of action: a PET investigation of agency,”
Nature Neuroscience, vol. 4, no. 5, pp. 546–550, 2001.
[35] P. L. S. Jacques, M. A. Conway, M. W. Lowder, and R. Cabeza,
“Watchingmymind unfold versus yours: an fMRI study using a
novel camera technology to examine neural differences in self-
projection of self versus other perspectives,” Journal of Cognitive
Neuroscience, vol. 23, no. 6, pp. 1275–1284, 2011.
[36] M. Peer, R. Lyon, and S. Arzy, “Orientation and disorientation:
lessons from patients with epilepsy,” Epilepsy and Behavior, vol.
41, pp. 149–157, 2014.





















































 Computational and  
Mathematical Methods 
in Medicine
Depression Research 
and Treatment
Hindawi Publishing Corporation
http://www.hindawi.com Volume 2014
Hindawi Publishing Corporation
http://www.hindawi.com Volume 2014
Brain Science
International Journal of
Stroke
Research and Treatment
Hindawi Publishing Corporation
http://www.hindawi.com Volume 2014
Neurodegenerative 
Diseases
Hindawi Publishing Corporation
http://www.hindawi.com Volume 2014
Journal of
Cardiovascular Psychiatry 
and Neurology
Hindawi Publishing Corporation
http://www.hindawi.com Volume 2014
